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Abstract  29 
Emerging evidence suggests that many of the clinical constructs used to help understand and 30 
explain obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms, and negative mood, may be causally interrelated. 31 
One approach to understanding this interrelatedness is a motivational systems approach. This 32 
approach suggests that rather than considering clinical constructs and negative affect as separable 33 
entities, they are all features of an integrated threat management system, and as such are highly 34 
coordinated and interdependent. The aim of the present study was to examine if clinical 35 
constructs related to OC symptoms and negative mood are best treated as separable or, 36 
alternatively, if these clinical constructs and negative mood are best seen as indicators of an 37 
underlying superordinate variable, as would be predicted by a motivational systems approach. A 38 
sample of 370 student participants completed measures of mood and the clinical constructs of 39 
inflated responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty (IU), not just right experiences (NJREs) and 40 
checking stop rules. An exploratory factor analysis suggested two plausible factor structures, one 41 
where all construct items and negative mood items loaded onto one underlying superordinate 42 
variable, and a second structure comprising of 5 factors, where each item loaded onto a factor 43 
representative of what the item was originally intended to measure. A confirmatory factor 44 
analysis showed that the five factor model was preferential to the one factor model, suggesting 45 
the four constructs and negative mood are best conceptualised as separate variables.  Given the 46 
predictions of a motivational systems approach were not supported in the current study, other 47 
possible explanations for the causal interrelatedness between clinical constructs and negative 48 
mood are discussed.  49 
 50 
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1: Introduction 65 
A number of clinical constructs have been identified and causally linked to obsessive-66 
compulsive (OC) symptoms (Davey, 2003). These constructs aim to capture the beliefs, attitudes 67 
and thought patterns associated with OC symptoms, and examples of such constructs include 68 
intolerance of uncertainty (IU; Beech & Liddell, 1974) and inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 69 
1985). In addition to the aforementioned clinical constructs, negative mood has also been 70 
casually linked to OC symptoms. For example, Salkovskis and Freeston (2001) proposed that 71 
negative mood may increase the occurrence of intrusive thoughts, increase the accessibility of 72 
negative assumptions, increase the likelihood of inadequate appraisals and decrease the efficacy 73 
of dismissal, suppression, and other neutralising strategies. Whilst on occasion two or more of 74 
these clinical constructs maybe connected together in a causal model (see e.g., Lind & Boschen 75 
2009) more often these constructs are treated as separable and as having separable causal effects 76 
on OC symptoms. The aim of the present study is to examine if clinical constructs related to OC 77 
symptoms and negative mood are best treated as separable or, alternatively, if these clinical 78 
constructs and negative mood are best seen as indicators of an underlying superordinate variable 79 
or variables. 80 
 81 
Consistent with the idea that constructs are separable, constructs are usually measured 82 
using separate inventories or sub-scales (see e.g., Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 83 
Group [OCCWG], 1997) and constructs have been manipulated independently of one another to 84 
examine their effect on OC symptoms (e.g., Ladouceur et al. 1995). Most theories are silent on 85 
any potential relationship between constructs or explicitly state they believe constructs to be 86 
separable (e.g. Summerfeldt 2004, 2007) and, when constructs are examined together within a 87 
single study, they are usually placed head to head against one another to see which construct 88 
“best” predicts OC symptoms (e.g., Steketee et al., 1998) - an approach which emphasizes the 89 
supposed separable nature of the constructs and the differences, as opposed to the similarities, 90 
between them. This approach is often taken in studies even when the relevant constructs have 91 
been shown to be at least moderately correlated with one another within the same study (e.g., 92 
Steketee et al., 1998). 93 
 94 
However, emerging research suggests that constructs may interact to increase OC 95 
symptoms and that constructs themselves may be causally interrelated. For example, using a 96 
mediation model, Lind and Boschen (2009) found that the relationship between inflated 97 
responsibility and checking was fully mediated by IU. In a series of three experiments that 98 
explored the causal relationships between inflated responsibility, IU and negative mood, Britton 99 
and Davey (2014) found that all three constructs were causally interrelated. Similarly, Dash and 100 
Davey (2012) found that manipulating negative mood casually affected the deployment of as-101 
many-as-can (AMAC) stop rules, whilst Britton (2011) found that manipulating inflated 102 
responsibility increases the intensity of “not just right experiences” (NJRE). 103 
 104 
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Britton and Davey (2014) interpreted their results within a motivational systems 105 
approach. In this approach emotions such as anxiety are seen as features of a ‘precautionary 106 
system’ that simultaneously alerts the individual to challenges and threats to goals, and 107 
coordinates cognitive and behavioural reactions in order that the individual can respond more 108 
effectively to these challenges and threats. Individual threat management systems such as this 109 
will be characterised by a functional coherence in which perceptual, affective, cognitive and 110 
behavioral processes work together to reduce the fitness costs of potential threats (e.g., Frijda 111 
1986; Keltner et al., 2006). As perceptual, affective, cognitive and behavioral elements are all 112 
part of an integrated evolved functional system, we would expect these elements to be highly 113 
coordinated and interdependent, with the affective experience being an emerging property of the 114 
activation of the various functional elements in the system (Neuberg et al., 2011; Kendrick & 115 
Shiota, 2008). Britton and Davey (2014) argued that if disorders such as OC disorder (OCD) are 116 
fundamentally derived from anxiety as an adaptive emotion then one implication of the 117 
motivational systems view is that emotional, cognitive and behavioral elements characteristic of 118 
anxiety should be coordinated and interdependent within the threat management system relevant 119 
to anxiety, and the integrated nature of the relationships between negative mood and constructs 120 
such as inflated responsibility and IU are supportive of such a view. Rather than one set of 121 
factors (e.g., constructs) being causes of a different set of factors (e.g., affect), they are all 122 
integrated components of an anxiety precautionary system that promotes a ‘cascade’ of relevant 123 
perceptions, cognitions, behaviors and affective experience conducive to solving the adaptive 124 
problem (Kenrick et al., 2010).  125 
 126 
The primary purpose of this paper is to further examine the underlying relationship 127 
between 4 constructs related to OC disorder and negative mood. Specifically, the primary aim of 128 
the current study was to examine if these clinical constructs and negative mood are separable or 129 
if they are indicators of a single superordinate variable, as would be suggested by a motivational 130 
system approach, or, alternatively, if they are indicative of a different number of underlying 131 
variables. Due to the large number of clinical constructs linked to OCD within the literature, the 132 
authors’ chose to include only those constructs which have been shown to be casually related to 133 
each other and/or with negative mood within the literature. 134 
 135 
In addition to negative mood, the clinical constructs IU and inflated responsibility were 136 
measured in the current study as evidence suggests they have bidirectional relationships with 137 
both negative mood and with each other (Britton & Davey, 2014). IU is defined as a 138 
“dispositional characteristic that arises from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 139 
connotations and consequences” (Birrell et al., 2011, p.1200) and is underpinned by appraisals 140 
such as ‘uncertainty is dangerous’, ‘uncertainty is intolerable’ and ‘I can’t deal with uncertainty’ 141 
(Koerner & Dugas, 2006). Inflated responsibility is defined as the belief that one has the power 142 
to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes (Salkovskis, 1985; Rachman, 143 
1998).  144 
 145 
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Two further constructs were also measured in the current study as evidence suggests that 146 
they are causally facilitated by negative mood, IU or inflated responsibility (Dash & Davey, 147 
2012; Britton, 2011) and therefore these constructs may potentially be coordinated and 148 
interdependent within any relevant threat management system. NJREs can be defined as, “the 149 
subjective sense that something isn’t just as it should be”, an unsettled feeling due to something 150 
in the individual or in the world around them not being right (Coles et al., 2003). The final 151 
construct focused on in this paper is “as many as can” (AMAC) goal-directed stop rules for 152 
checking. Stop rules can be best explained by linking them to task motivation. Broadly, two 153 
specific types of task motivation have been proposed, performance focused motivation and task 154 
focused motivation (Vaughn et al., 2006). A performance motivated individual who engages in a 155 
task will be focused on meeting a certain standard or criteria whilst engaged in that task. The 156 
person motivated in this way is likely to continue with the task until they have met their given 157 
standard or criteria for that task (e.g. Hirt et al., 1996). In contrast, a task motivated individual 158 
who engages in a task will do so without concern about evaluation or without any particular 159 
performance standards for the task. A person using AMAC stop rules whilst engaged in a task 160 
(such as checking or worrying) is analogous to someone using performance focused motivation, 161 
the individual’s AMAC stop rule for that task will encourage them to continue with the task until 162 
they are sure they have met whatever their specific criteria or standard was for that task.   163 
 164 
It is of note that all four constructs measured in the current study have been shown to 165 
have a causal effect on OC symptoms (Ladouceur et al., 1995; Toffolo et al., 2013; Coles et al., 166 
2005; MacDonald & Davey, 2005) and each have also been linked to anxiety related symptoms 167 
(Startup & Davey, 2003; Ladouceur et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2003) making an exploration of the 168 
relatedness of these constructs also of relevance to anxiety disorders. In summary, the primary 169 
aim of the current study is to explore the underlying relationships between negative mood and 4 170 
OC symptom related constructs which recent evidence suggest are causally interrelated.  A threat 171 
management system approach would suggest that each construct and negative mood would be 172 
best depicted as an indicator of a single superordinate variable whilst, if constructs and negative 173 
mood are separable, we would predict that a 5 factor model would be the best depiction of these 174 
relationships, with each of the 4 constructs and negative mood, respectively, represented by a 175 
single factor. Plausible arguments could be made for other factor solutions. For example, 176 
Summerfeldt’s (2004, 2007) model of OCD proposes two core, continuous, orthogonal 177 
dimensions to explain the motivational processes important to the development and maintenance 178 
of OCD: harm avoidance (as characterised by inflated responsibility) and incompleteness (as 179 
characterised by NJRE). This model would suggest that NJRE and inflated responsibility should 180 
be represented by two separate factors. However, it would be difficult to predict based on this 181 
model if negative mood, for example, should load onto either of these two factors or a separate 182 
factor.   183 
 184 
In order to explore the factor structure underlying the four constructs and negative mood 185 
an exploratory factor analysis was first carried out in order to ascertain possible factor structures 186 
underlying the relationships between the 4 measured constructs and negative mood. Any 187 
emerging plausible models based on the findings of this exploratory factor analysis were then 188 
directly compared with one another using confirmatory factor analysis.     189 
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 190 
2: Method 191 
2.1: Participants 192 
A questionnaire booklet was completed by a student sample of 370 participants (male: 193 
74; female: 296). Ages ranged from 17 to 74 years (M = 27.38, SD = 11.96).  48.3% of the 194 
sample in the current study consisted of psychology undergraduates at the University of Sussex 195 
who received partial fulfilment of a course requirement by taking part in the study. The reminder 196 
of the sample represent other students, university staff and university visitors who volunteered to 197 
fill in the questionnaire after being initially approached by the researcher. This latter groups of 198 
participants received the gratitude of the researcher for participation but were not financially 199 
rewarded. 200 
 201 
2.2: Procedure 202 
Participants were provided with questionnaire-batteries, with every second questionnaire 203 
package reverse ordered. Participants were asked to supply some very basic demographic 204 
information and to provide informed consent before completing the questionnaire.  205 
 206 
This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of British 207 
Psychological Society with written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written 208 
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by 209 
the ethics committee at the University of Sussex. 210 
 211 
2.3: Measures 212 
IU was measured using the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS, Freeston et al., 1994), 213 
which was designed to measure an individual’s IU, particularly the ideas that uncertainty is 214 
unacceptable, reflects badly on a person, leads to frustration and stress, and leads to the inability 215 
to take action. The IUS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = .94), good test–216 
retest reliability (r = .78) and convergent and divergent validity (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). The IUS 217 
had excellent internal consistency in the current study (α = .95). 218 
  219 
NJREs were measured using the The Not Just Right Experiences-Questionnaire Revised 220 
(NJRE-QR, Coles et al., 2003) which is composed of 19 items. The first ten items measure how 221 
often NJRE occur. The next two items (items 11 and 12) ask respondents to indicate which 222 
NJRE occurred most recently and when it last occurred (past few hours to past month). The last 7 223 
items in the questionnaire measure the intensity of NJRE. The NJRE-QR produces two total 224 
scores, NJRE occurrence (composite score of NJRE-QR items 1-10) and NJRE intensity 225 
(composite score of NJRE-QR items 13-19). Coles et al., (2003) found good internal consistency 226 
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(α =.79) for the 10 NJRE occurrence items, and all 19 items showed good convergent and 227 
discriminant validity, evident in stronger correlations with OCD symptoms than with depressive 228 
symptoms, trait anxiety, social anxiety or worry. In the current sample the NJRE occurrence sub-229 
scale showed acceptable internal consistency (α = .74) whilst the NJRE intensity scale showed 230 
excellent internal consistency (α = .94).  231 
 232 
Negative mood was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, 233 
Watson et al., 1988) which consists of two 10-item mood scales. The first is a measure of 234 
positive affect and lists 10 “positive” emotions and the second is a measure of negative affect 235 
and lists 10 “negative” emotions. Watson et al., (1988) report that both scales have good internal 236 
consistency (reliability of the positive affect scale ranged from α = .86 to α =.90, the negative 237 
affect scale from α = .84 to α = .87). The construct validity of the scale has been supported (see 238 
Crawford & Henry, 2004). In the current sample both the positive affect scale (α = .87) and the 239 
negative affect scale (α = .88) showed good internal consistency.  240 
 241 
Inflated responsibility was measured using the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; 242 
Salkovskis et al., 2000), a 26-item questionnaire that measures general beliefs related to inflated 243 
responsibility. The internal consistency of the scale is excellent and test–retest reliability is also 244 
excellent (r = .94, Salkovskis et al., 2000). Several studies attest to the measures convergent 245 
validity (Salkovskis et al., 2000; Yorulmaz et al., 2002).  The RAS had excellent internal 246 
consistency in the current study (α = .92).  247 
 248 
AMAC checking stop rules were measured using the Checking Stop Rule Questionnaire 249 
(CSRQ, Britton 2011), a 20-item questionnaire where 10 items  measure endorsement of AMAC 250 
stop rules and where 10  measure endorsement of “feel like continuing” (FLC) stop rules. Britton 251 
(2011) reported that two factors underlie the CSRQ, the first measuring AMAC stop rules and 252 
the second FLC stop rules and that both of these factors are reliable (reliability for AMAC 253 
subscale was α = .91, reliability for the FLC subscale was α = .88). The same study found that 254 
the CSRQ’s two subscales correlate in expected directions with other relevant constructs 255 
providing evidence of the CSRQ’s validity (Britton, 2011). In the present study the AMAC 256 
subscale had excellent internal consistency (α = .91) whilst the FLC subscale had very good 257 
internal consistency (α = .89).  258 
 259 
3: Results 260 
3.1: Missing data 261 
There was very little missing data in the sample; overall 99.12% of the total number of 262 
questions were answered across the sample. Therefore, any missing data was imputed by adding 263 
the mean of the relevant question.  264 
 265 
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3.2: Preliminary analysis 266 
A preliminary analysis was conducted to examine the Pearson’s correlation between the 267 
total scores (or relevant sub-scale scores) on the questionnaire measures of the four constructs 268 
and negative mood. IU, inflated responsibility, negative mood, AMAC stop rule use and NJRE 269 
occurrence and intensity were all significantly correlated, with correlations ranging from medium 270 
to large in terms of size (correlations ranging from .36 to .69, see table 1). From this preliminary 271 
analysis it is realistic to assume that IU, inflated responsibility, negative mood, AMAC stop rule 272 
use, NJRE occurrence and NJRE intensity all overlap and possibly reflect some underlying 273 
superordinate variable. 274 
 275 
Table 1: Pearson correlation coefficients between the total scores on the 4 clinical constructs and 276 
negative mood. 277 
 IU Inflated 
Responsibility 
Negative 
mood 
NJRE 
Occurrence 
NJRE  
Intensity 
AMAC 
IU † .59* .56* .48* .44* .48* 
Inflated 
Responsibility 
 † .42* .36* .36* .48* 
Negative mood   † .37* .37* .40* 
NJRE Occurrence    † .69* .43* 
NJRE Intensity     † .44* 
AMAC      † 
 *p < .001, Two-tailed significance reported.  278 
 279 
3.3: Analytic strategy and treatment of categorical data 280 
In order to explore to explore if the constructs and negative mood are separable or if they 281 
are best seen as indicators of one (or more) superordinate variables, a two-stage approach was 282 
taken. Firstly, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to provide an indication of how 283 
many factors may underlie the data set. Secondly, plausible factor structures (as suggest by the 284 
exploratory factor analysis) were compared directly using confirmatory factor analysis. 285 
 286 
Items entered into a factor analysis should generally be continuous as opposed to 287 
categorical (Kline, 2005). Within the current study, 10 items were measured on scales with less 288 
than 5 levels. These 10 items are the first ten items of the NJRE-QR. Each of these items ask the 289 
participant to state if they have experienced a specific NJRE within the past month (e.g. I have 290 
had the sensation after getting dressed that parts of my clothes tags, collars, pant legs, etc, didn’t 291 
feel just right) and participants are simply asked to offer a yes or no response. Kline (2005) 292 
suggests one way to overcome the problem of categorical items in factor analysis is to parcel 293 
items together, that is to create one or more total scores (linear composites) across a set of two or 294 
more items. These parcels can then be treated as continuous indicators. It was decided to 295 
therefore make two composite variables (both of which would have a range of possible scores 296 
from 0 to 5). The response to NJRE items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were combined to make a composite 297 
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score, NJRE occurrence 1. In support of the combination of all of these items into one score, all 298 
of the individual items were significantly positively correlated with each other (all correlations 299 
significant at p <.001). The responses to NJRE items 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 were combined to make a 300 
second composite score, NJRE occurrence 2. In support of the combination of all of these items 301 
into one score, all of the individual items were significantly positively correlated with each other 302 
(all correlations significant at p <.01). With these 10 variables transformed into two composite 303 
scores, all variables in the data set were now measured on a scale with at least 5 levels.         304 
  305 
3.4: Exploratory factor analysis 306 
An exploratory factor analysis was performed on the four constructs and negative mood 307 
to explore the factor structure underlying these variables. All of the 26 items measuring inflated 308 
responsibility (the RAS), the 27 items measuring IU (the IUS), the 10 items measuring AMAC 309 
stop rule use (from the CSRQ) and the 10 items measuring negative mood (from the PANAS) 310 
were examined in the analysis. In addition, the two composite NJRE occurrence variables 311 
described in the previous section and the items in the NJRE-QR measured on separate 7-point 312 
Likert scales (items 13-19) were also examined in the analysis (giving a total of  82 items).  313 
 314 
Communalities ranged from .50 to .84. Fifteen components had eigenvalues over 1: 315 
23.29, 5.02, 4.59, 3.37, 3.15, 1.97, 1.70, 1.54, 1.36, 1.25, 1.20, 1.13, 1.12, 1.07, 1.01. The scree 316 
plot was used to determine the optimum number of factors (as recommended by e.g., Catell, 317 
1966; Field, 2009). The scree plot strongly indicated a one or five factor solution over alternative 318 
factor solutions (e.g., a two factor solution or three factor solution) and so these two possible 319 
factor structures were further explored. 320 
 321 
Firstly, a factor analysis was run extracting one factor. This solution explained 23.29% of 322 
the variance. The internal consistency for this scale was excellent (α = .96).  Examination of the 323 
factor loadings showed that while most of the items had moderate loadings (.40 or above, Field, 324 
2009) on the one emergent factor, 9 items did not. Of the items which did not load moderately 325 
onto the emergent factor, 7 were from the RAS, one from the CSRQ and one from the PANAS. 326 
 327 
Secondly, a factor analysis was run extracting five factors with varimax rotation (a 328 
varimax rotation was used to aid with interpretation of the emergent factors, however, it is of 329 
note that an oblique rotation was also run which produced a nearly identical factor solution to the 330 
varimax rotation. The results of the oblique rotation are therefore not reported). After rotation the 331 
five emergent factors had eigenvalues of: 12.28, 8.55, 6.65, 6.23 and 5.61. This solution 332 
explained 47.94% of the variance. Looking at the rotated component matrix the resulting scale 333 
produced 5 reliable subscales each separately measuring each of the original 5 constructs; IU, 334 
inflated responsibility, negative mood, NJRE, AMAC stop rules (see table 2 for internal 335 
consistency, means and standard deviations on the five scales and correlations between factors). 336 
Of note is the fact that all of the items thought to measure a particular construct loaded most 337 
strongly onto the factor thought to represent that construct.  338 
 339 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the 5 constructs and correlations between factors (n = 370). 340 
 Internal 
Consistency 
Mean 
(SD) 
2 3 4 5 
1. AMAC α = .91 2.46 
(.90) 
.48* .48* .44* .40* 
2. Inflated 
responsibility 
α = .92 3.60 
(.91) 
 .60* .37* .41* 
3. IU α = .95 1.98 
(.71) 
  .47* .55* 
4. NJRE α = .91 4.72 
(3.64) 
   .39* 
5. Negative 
Mood 
α = .89 2.59 
(.81) 
    
Note: * p <.001. Two-tailed significance reported. 341 
 342 
3.5: Confirmatory factor analysis 343 
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed to directly compare the five factor model 344 
and the one factor model.  345 
 346 
The one factor model was specified so that all items loaded directly onto one factor. In 347 
the five factor model items were specified to load onto only one of five factors according to the 348 
pattern indicated by the five factor solution (i.e. all IU items loading only onto factor 1, or the IU 349 
factor, all RAS items loading only onto factor 2, or the inflated responsibility factor, all negative 350 
mood PANAS items load only onto factor 3, or the negative mood factor, all NJRE-QR factors 351 
loading only onto factor 4, or the NJRE factor, all AMAC CSRQ items loading only onto factor 352 
5, or the AMAC factor). In the model all five factors were specified to correlate with one another 353 
(as is suggested in table 2).  354 
 355 
This analysis showed the five factor model is a significantly better fit than the one factor 356 
model, Δχ² (10) = 4840, p <. 001.The five factor solution is therefore preferred over the one 357 
factor solution.  358 
 359 
It should be noted that neither the one factor nor the five factor model were an especially 360 
good fit to the data using many conventional fit indices, although observation of these indices 361 
support the findings of the chi-square test, suggesting that the five factor model is a better fit to 362 
the data than the one factor model. The reason for such poor fit, in relation to both models, is 363 
Running title: The relationship between clinical constructs 
11 
 
 
because a large number of significant pathways were not specified in the models as doing so 364 
would have compromised the point of the analysis: to test the relative fit of a one factor vs five 365 
factor model. A list of the significant pathways not added to the models by type are: correlations 366 
between error terms, correlations between items, correlations between error terms and items (five 367 
factor model only), correlations between error terms and latent variables (five factor model only) 368 
and correlations between items and latent variables (five factor model only). Values for selected 369 
fit indices for the one factor model are: CFI = .51, RMR = .22, RMSEA = .08 with 90% 370 
confidence interval .08-.09. Values for selected fit indices for the five factor model are: CFI = 371 
.79, RMR = .12, RMSEA = .06 with 90% confidence interval .05-.06.  372 
 373 
4: Discussion 374 
The analyses reported in this paper demonstrate that inflated responsibility, IU, NJRE, 375 
AMAC stop rules and negative mood are best seen as five separate variables rather than as 376 
indicators of an underlying superordinate variable or variables. The exploratory factor analysis 377 
suggested two plausible factor structures, one where all construct items and negative mood items 378 
loaded onto one underlying superordinate variable, and a second structure comprising of 5 379 
factors, where each item loaded onto a factor representative of what the item was originally 380 
intended to measure (i.e. all IU items loading only onto factor 1, or the IU factor, all RAS items 381 
loading only onto factor 2, or the inflated responsibility factor etc). A confirmatory factor 382 
analysis showed that the five factor model was preferential to the one factor model, suggesting 383 
the four constructs and negative mood are best conceptualised as separate variables.   384 
 385 
The results of the present study are therefore not supportive of a motivational systems 386 
approach in relation to explaining the relationships between constructs related to OC symptoms 387 
and negative mood (Britton & Davey, 2014). Such an approach would suggest that, as the 388 
constructs measured and negative mood are highly coordinated and interdependent within the 389 
relevant threat management system, they should all load onto one superordinate variable 390 
representative of that threat management system. Rather, the results of the present study suggest 391 
the four constructs and negative mood are separable and therefore support the fact that each of 392 
the clinical constructs are generally discussed, measured and manipulated separately from each 393 
other within the OCD literature. The results are also supportive of those theories which suggest 394 
that the constructs are separable, for example, Summerfeldt’s (2004, 2007) model of OCD which 395 
proposes two dimensions to explain the motivational processes important to the development and 396 
maintenance of OCD: harm avoidance (as characterised by inflated responsibility) and 397 
incompleteness (as characterised by NJRE). In addition, the results of the present study are 398 
supportive of those theories which suggest that clinical constructs and negative mood are 399 
separable, for example, Salkovskis et al’s (2000) model which suggests that inflated 400 
responsibility and negative mood are separate but causally interrelated variables which both 401 
increase the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. Cognitive treatments for OCD and anxiety 402 
disorders are often based on addressing the types of clinical constructs measured in the current 403 
paper (e.g., inflated responsibility, Kohlenberg & Vandenberghe, 2007; IU, Dugas & Ladouceur, 404 
2000). The results of the present study support the idea that it possible to separately address the 405 
clinical constructs measured in the current study in the treatment of OCD and anxiety disorders.   406 
 407 
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The finding that the constructs measured and negative mood seem to be separable rather 408 
than indicators of a core underlying variable raises a question: how do we explain bidirectional 409 
causal relationships between negative mood with constructs related to OC symptoms, and the 410 
bidirectional relationship between constructs themselves (e.g., Britton & Davey, 2014), if they 411 
are not indictors of one superordinate variable?  412 
 413 
One possibility is that although constructs related to OC symptoms and negative mood 414 
are unique and separable entities they are entities which to some extent overlap with one another, 415 
as indicated by the fact that all four constructs measured in the current study and negative mood 416 
appear to correlate moderately with one another. As such, the manipulation of one construct or 417 
negative mood will have a causal influence on other constructs measured (or negative mood), 418 
due to the overlapping relationship between the relevant constructs and negative mood.  419 
 420 
     Another possibility is that that while constructs related to OC symptoms and negative 421 
mood represent unique and separable entities, they are all connected to a third variable which 422 
mediates the relationship between them. One potential candidate for mediating the relationship 423 
between inflated responsibility, IU and negative mood (Britton & Davey, 2014) is that all three 424 
constructs affect information processing style, and in particular trigger systematic processing of 425 
information. Systematic processing is a bottom-up, data-driven and comprehensively analytic 426 
style in which perceivers access and scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and 427 
importance to their judgement, and integrate all information in forming their judgement (Chaiken 428 
et al., 1989). Negative mood has been shown experimentally to facilitate systematic processing 429 
(Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) as have a range of 430 
situational and dispositional factors including responsibility, accountability, desire for control, 431 
personal relevance and task importance (Chaiken et al., 1989; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; 432 
Lee et al., 1999; Ambady & Gray, 2002; Batra & Stayman, 1990; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; 433 
Sorrentino et al., 1988) and many of these factors are likely to be enhanced by feelings of 434 
inflated responsibility and IU. For example, feelings of IU have been linked to increases in desire 435 
for control (Krohne, 1993) whilst increases in inflated responsibility are likely to lead to an 436 
increased sense of task importance (Salkovskis, 1985). Negative mood in particular provides 437 
information that characterises a situation as problematic and fosters the spontaneous adoption of 438 
a systematic, detail-oriented, bottom-up processing style (Schwarz, 1990). Increasing feelings of 439 
responsibility will also signal a situation as problematic and foster systematic processing  440 
(Chaiken et al., 1989) – but only if the outcomes for which the individual feels responsible are 441 
appraised as having potentially harmful or threatening outcomes, a characteristic typical of the 442 
OC explanatory construct of inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985). An increase in IU will 443 
increase the desire for control (Krohne, 1993) and this in turn will also foster systematic 444 
processing (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). Thus, inflated responsibility, IU and negative mood 445 
are all factors that potentially have an integrated relationship with a specific information 446 
processing style which may explain the bidirectional causal relationships between them. 447 
Activation of that common processing style through increases in inflated responsibility, IU or 448 
negative mood, respectively, is likely to lead to an increase in scores on the other two constructs, 449 
as all three constructs are associated with increases in systematic processing. It is also of note 450 
that those individuals with OCD and OC tendencies use a more controlled information 451 
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processing style, even under conditions that non-OCD participants use a speed-oriented 452 
information processing style (Soref et al., 2008; Kalanthroff et al., 2014). 453 
 454 
Whilst the four constructs measured in the current study and negative mood appear to be 455 
separate variables, the fact that one factor explained a good deal of shared variance between the 456 
four constructs and negative mood in the exploratory factor analysis is of note. Whilst this factor 457 
may have simply been artifact of shared method variance, it is possible it maybe representative 458 
of a core genetic/biological deficit underlying OC symptoms (e.g., Maia et al., 2008) or anxiety 459 
related problems more generally (e.g., Norrholm & Ressler, 2009).  460 
 461 
Finally, the present study has a number of limitations. First, given a primarily student 462 
sample was used in the present study, it is not clear how generalisable the conclusions of this 463 
study are to a clinical population. It should be noted that taxometric studies have suggested that 464 
OC related symptoms are generally best considered as dimensional rather than categorical (e.g., 465 
Haslam et al., 2005) and many cognitive models of OC symptoms follow a dimensional model 466 
(e.g., Frost & Steketee, 2002) supporting the appropriateness of studying OC related phenomena 467 
in student samples.  However, the validity of the results presented in this paper would be 468 
strengthened if they were replicated within a clinical sample. Second, the present study measured 469 
only 4 constructs, and negative mood, and as such did not measure a number of other constructs 470 
that have been linked to OC symptoms (e.g., thought-action fusion, Rachman, 1993). Whilst this 471 
was done as we wished to include only those constructs which have been connected causally 472 
through experimental manipulation, it should be noted that the inclusion of other constructs may 473 
have led to a different factor structure emerging in the current study. A related limitation of the 474 
present study is that OC symptoms and anxiety symptoms which have been linked to the 475 
constructs measured in the current study (e.g., worry) were also not measured. Again, the 476 
inclusion of OC symptoms and symptoms related to other disorders may have led to a different 477 
factor structure emerging in the current study. Finally, only self-report measures were used in the 478 
current study. Whilst noting the limitations associated with self-report measures, the authors’ 479 
would comment that the constructs measured in the current study are almost exclusively 480 
measured by self-report in the wider OC literature, and so measurement of these constructs in 481 
this study is consistent with other research in this field.  482 
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